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The importance of having an effective corporate governance regime has been a 
central issue throughout the development of corporate law.1 The recent economic 
downturn has once again brought the laws of director’s liability and corporate 
governance into the public view. A company can only function through human 
actors. Corporate officers and directors2 act as the central hub of the conduct of a 
company who make decisions and direct the company in a particular course. 
Directors are accordingly at the core of many business scandals and failures in recent 
years with which the public has become so engrossed.3   
The common thread which runs through many spectacular corporate meltdowns of 
recent times is poor directorial decisions and corporate governance.4 Despite being 
more well-known in South Africa compared to other countries; it would be a mistake 
to think of corporate scandal and failure being isolated to America.5 Given the 
current context, it is unsurprising that legal regimes governing corporate governance 
and directorial liability have been the subject of much review and analysis by 
national legislatures, academics and the corporate communities globally.6 
Company law in general has a profound impact on economies for companies play 
a vital role within any economy. Companies potentially provide massive social 
benefit. Simultaneously there is the possibility that the separate legal personality that 
                                                
1 R Naidoo Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies 2nd Ed. (2009) 
at 2. 
2 The term ‘directors’ will be used to refer generally to corporate officers and directors throughout this 
dissertation despite the uncertainty as to whether this is the case: L Johnson ‘Corporate Officers and 
the Business Judgment Rule’ (2005) 60 Business Lawyer 439 and the sources cited therein; Lawrence 
A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III ‘Corporate Officers And The Business Judgment Rule: A 
Reply To Professor Johnson’ (2005) 60 Business Lawyer 865; JB Hardin & SR Tellies ‘California’s 
Business Judgment Rule is not a Defence for Corporate Officers’ (June 2013) Orange County Lawyer 
32. Viewed at http://ocbusinesslawyerblog.com/secure/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/201306061437-
2.pdf [last viewed on 3 February 2014]. It should suffice to say that in my opinion the business 
judgment rule in South African law will apply to corporate officers. 
3 J Mayanja ‘Promoting Enhanced Enforcement of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations: The Promise of 
Public Law Sanctions’ (2007) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 20(2) 157. See also: The Failure 
of HIH Insurance: A corporate collapse and its lessons Vol.1 (2003) viewed at 
http://www.publicaccountants.org.au/media/76396/a00009280.pdf [last viewed 30 January 2014]; and 
R Monem ‘The One-Tel Collapse: Lessons for Corporate Governance’ viewed at 
http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/42673/74746_1.pdf;jsessionid=C7819C
A25660076F1B7D3E546655FBB9?sequence=1 [last viewed 30 January 2014]. 
4 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, In the Matter of Richstar Enterprises Pty Ltd 
(ACN 099 071 968) v Carey (No.3) [2006] FCA 433; (2006) 24 ACLC 581 at 583-4. 
5 Ibid. 
6TM Aman ‘Cost-benefit Analysis of the Business Judgment Rule: A Critique in Light of the 





companies provide may be exploited, which may in turn negatively impact society on 
a grand scale. The previous legislation that governed company law in South Africa 
was in existence for 37 years and was amended 42 times during that period.7 Much 
of the law governing the duties and liability of corporate directors was found within 
the King II Code and the common law.8 The laws governing directors’ duties and 
responsibilities were inaccessible to most corporate actors and the public, archaic, 
outdated, and at times even wholly inappropriate for a modern developing country 
such as South Africa.  
The South African Companies Act 71 of 20089 which became effective on 1 May 
2011 has introduced a multitude of changes within South African company law and 
is aimed at making the law more readily accessible to society in general. It has 
consequently been drafted in ‘plain language’. Throughout the legislative process the 
Department of Trade and Industry made it clear that the aim of the Act would be to 
modernise company law in order to align with international trends and accommodate 
for the needs of modern corporations conducting business in South Africa’s unique 
commercial and societal context.10 The Act consequently introduces a number of 
new rules and legal principles, changes existing common law and even alters the 
policies and philosophy of corporate law in general. 
The legislature saw fit to partially codify the law regarding director’s duties and 
liabilities in the attempt at making the law more accessible.11 In many respects the 
Companies Act has created a wider base of potential liability for directors, whilst 
simultaneously it has introduced the business judgment rule into South African 
corporate law. The business judgment rule is an American common law device 
which limits director liability in cases where the directors are accused of 
contravening the duty of care and skill when making business decisions. There is 
thus both the widening of potential director liability which is tempered by the 
introduction of a liability limiting device in the form of the business judgment rule. 
                                                
7 Companies Act 61 of 1973 as amended. 
8 MM Botha ‘The Role and Duties of Directors in the Promotion of Corporate Governance: A South 
African Perspective’ (2009) 3 Obiter 702 at 706. 
9 Companies Act 71 of 2008. From here on referred to as ‘the Companies Act’. 
10 South African Company Law for the 21st Century – Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform (GG 
26493 of 23 June 2004) (referred to as Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform). 
11 D Ahern ‘Directors’ Duties, dry ink and the accessibility agenda’ (2012) 128 (January) Law 







Further - the common law remains relevant which doesn’t fully match the relevant 
sections of the Companies Act. Clearly then – there is much uncertainty which must 
be clarified. 
Section 76(4)(a) of the Companies Act codifies the business judgment rule into 
South African law. This is an interesting addition given the relative upheaval and 
uncertainty in this area of the law in America. In Delaware (arguably the state with 
not only the most thoroughly developed business judgment rule but arguably also the 
state most sympathetic or deferential to director conduct) it would appear as though 
the protection afforded by the business judgment rule is being eroded. This is most 
likely a reaction to the recent corporate scandals such as that of Enron, which has led 
one commentator to conclude that the recent Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions 
“depart dramatically from the tradition of management deference”.12 This recent shift 
adds even more complexity to the already confusing and largely contested law 
pertaining to the common law business judgment rule in America. The underlying 
cause of concern seems to be finding the correct balance between directors’ authority 
to steer the company in a particular direction and the shareholders’ right to hold the 
directors accountable for their decisions.13 The business judgment rule has acted as 
the primary judicial mechanism which has been adopted by the judiciary as a means 
of balancing this tension. 
A director owes two distinctive types of duties to a company: the fiduciary-type 
duties and the negligence-type duties of care, skill and diligence. Both forms of 
directors’ duties function concurrently to restrict the powers of directors.14 The South 
African law concerning directors’ duties is intricate under both the common law and 
the Companies Act. This is an area of corporate law which allows for a wealth of 
practical and theoretical difficulty. 15  I aim to deconstruct the intricacy of the 
                                                
12 RM Jones ‘Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform’ (2004) 29 Journal of 
Corporation Law 644 at 625; L Herzel and L Katz ‘Smith v Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging 
Business Judgment’ (1986) 41 Business Lawyer 1187 at 1188. 
13 AM Scarlett ‘A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and Accountability in Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation’ (2008) 57 University of Kansas Law Review 39 at 40-1. SM Bainbridge ‘The 
Business Judgement Rule as Abstention Doctrine’ (2004) 57 Vanderbilt Law Review 84 at 109; V 
Finch ‘Company Directors: Who Care about Skill and Care?’ (1992) 55 Modern Law Review 176. 
14 C Giraldo ‘Factors Governing the Application of the Business Judgment Rule: An Empirical Study 
of the US, UK, Australia and the EU’ (2006) Vicepresidencia Juridica Bogota (Colombia) No.111 at 
120; T Mongalo Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Global Picture of Business 
Undertakings in South Africa 1st Ed. (2003) 158. 





American experience of the business judgment rule, with particular reference to the 
rule in Delaware, so as to present what I perceive to be the correct practical 
application of the rule in South African corporate law. This dissertation does not 
address the wisdom of the decision to transplant and codify the American business 
judgment rule within the Companies Act.  
Part 2 will briefly discuss the relevance and importance of the duty of care in 
South Africa with regard to the introduction of the business judgment rule. Part 3 
will outline the business judgment rule’s history and modern development in 
America. Particular focus will be on the law of Delaware which is the jurisdiction 
that contains the most developed business judgment rule. Part 4 will discuss the rule 
in South Africa prior to the coming into force of the Companies Act and then as 
codified in South Africa. Part 5 will discuss the relationship and interaction between 
the fiduciary duties (especially the duty to act in the best interests of the company), 
the duty of care and the business judgment rule. Part 6 will briefly justify the 
inclusion and importance of the business judgment rule in the Companies Act. There 
are many different explanations of the manner in which the rule operates and how the 
rule should be commonly understood under Delaware law.  I will discuss two 
differing interpretations of the rule which are currently competing within the 
academic literature in Part 7: whether the rule is more theoretically correct as either a 
doctrine of judicial abstention or as a doctrine of immunity. In Part 8; I will discuss 
which of these two interpretations should be adopted given South Africa’s unique 
socio-economic context and in Part 9 I will present what I perceive to be the correct 
practical operation of the rule. Part 10 will be the conclusion and a bibliography is 
found within Part 11. 
2. UNDERSTANDING THE DUTY OF CARE AND SKILL 
The business judgment rule is inseparable from the duty of care and skill. 16 The 
rule applies to the specific aspect of decision making under the duty of care. 
Understanding the duty of care is accordingly imperative for correctly understanding 
the business judgment rule. This chapter will discuss the general application and 
                                                







importance of the duty of care generally as well as the operation of the statutory duty 
of care, skill and diligence under section 76(3)(c) of the Companies Act.17  
General	  Application	  and	  Common	  Law	  Understanding	  
A director owes two distinct forms of duty to a company. These may be broadly 
divided between the fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill. These duties 
together act to restrict the powers of directors. The duty of care and skill is owed to 
the company in general and not to the shareholders. Directors are required to manage 
the business of the company as a reasonably prudent persons would manage their 
own affairs.18The duty of care and skill is a non-fiduciary duty and is founded on the 
law of negligence. Directors may consequently be held liable for the negligent non-
performance their duties of care and skill. The more difficult investigation is the 
extent to which directors who have negligently caused a loss to the company are 
liable for that loss.19  
The duty of care is rooted within the law of delict and the concept of negligence.20 
One must be careful to recognise that under the South African law of delict, fault and 
wrongfulness are distinct concepts and both must be present if delictual liability for 
negligent conduct is to attach to a director.21 This is different from the position under 
English common law duty of care, for wrongfulness is not a clearly defined 
independent requirement that must be proved for liability to attach to a director. In 
contrast to the general law of negligence in South Africa which is a primarily 
objective determination based on the ‘reasonable person standard’; the duty of care 
in corporate law has been applied using a primarily subjective determination and 
subjective nomenclature.22The repercussion of this has been to apply a low threshold 
standard of director conduct for directors were under the common law expected to 
exercise only that degree of care and skill that the individual director was capable of. 
                                                
17 The duty of care, skill and diligence under section 76(3)(c) will be referred to throughout this 
dissertation as ‘the statutory duty of care’. 
18 MM Botha (supra). 
19 FHI Cassim (ed.) Contemporary Company Law 2nd Ed. (2012) 554. 
20 Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 (3) SA 71 (T); Du Plessis NO v Phelps 1995 
(4) SA 165 (C). 
21 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden [2002] ZASCA 79; Trustees, Two Oceans 
Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templar 2006 (3) SA 138 (SCA). 





Under this formulation a director may have even acted with ‘galactic stupidity’23 and 
yet still be found not liable for it would have been the director’s lack of experience, 
ignorance, or sheer lack of competence which protected the director from liability.24 
Prior to the coming into force of the Companies Act, the duty of care was wholly 
encapsulated within the common law. The courts did not actively enforce adherence 
with the duty of care in the same strenuous manner as the fiduciary duties.25 This 
approach was based on the belief that ultimately it was shareholders who were 
responsible for the loss to the company – for it was the shareholders who appointed 
the directors and therefore should suffer the loss of their own foolishness.26 The 
difficulties which were prevalent in the common law derivative action also affected 
the enforcement of the duty of care and skill. The common law derivative action was 
severely limited in both its scope of application and the persons to whom it was 
available. It was largely limited to instances where the persons who caused harm to 
the company were simultaneously in control of the company which suffered a 
harm.27 The ratifiability principle, the cost of litigation, the onerous burden of 
proving which person or persons caused the harm to the company, problems attaining 
evidence to prove a claim, and the limited number of persons who could enforce the 
derivative action meant that there was a lack of willing and able litigants who had the 
ability to enforce the duty of care and skill.  
Clearly the common law and the position under the 1973 Companies Act did not 
enhance judicial enforcement of the duty of care and skill. There is accordingly a 
dearth of cases in South African law where liability has been imposed on a director 
for breach of the duty of care and skill. This duty has subsequently been described as 
a “tenuous and risky foundation” on which to bring a claim against a director and to 
hold that director personally liable for harm caused to the company.28 South Africa is 
not alone in this problematic experience. The jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, 
                                                
23 D Rosenberg ‘Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule’ (2007) 32 Journal of 
Corporation Law 301. 
24 FHI Cassim ‘Fraudulent or Reckless trading and s.424 of the Companies Act of 1973’ (1981) 98 
SALJ 162. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Daniels (formerly practising as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 
(1995) 16 ACSR 607 (NSW) (refered to from here as Daniels v Anderson). 
27 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189; Section 266 of the Companies Act 71 of 1973; 
Contemporary Company Law (supra) 775-779.  








Australia29 and America30 have a similar history and will likely continue to grapple 
with many of the same problems as South Africa does. Recent statutory 
developments and judicial decisions31 in these jurisdictions may be evidence of a 
swing towards a more stringent application and enforcement of the duty of care and 
skill; but it may be concluded that under the common law the position regarding the 
duty remains somewhat more skewed to the benefit of the director. 
There is a strong case to be made for the duty of care and skill which applies to 
directors to remain primarilly a subjective determination.32 The context within which 
individual directors function are vastly different. The courts throughout the 
development of the common law duty of care and skill have as a result constantly 
tackled with prescribing a single unified standard for all directors. A director is not 
required to have any special education nor qualifications in order to hold office as a 
director. Nor are directors members of a single unified professional body in the same 
manner as say a doctor or lawyer is a member. There are different types of 
companies which vary greatly according to size, form and function. To further 
complicate matters there are different types of directors within companies, each of 
whom may be required to fulfil differing roles and functions. It is intuitively obvious 
from this brief description that not all directors are the same. A single objective 
standard which may be prescribed to all directors is consequently not feasible. The 
duty of care and skill which relates to each director “must depend on the type of 
company the type of director…and his or her particular skills and knowledge…”33 
One of the earliest and certainly law defining decisions which grappled with this 
very problem was that of Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd.34It was 
held in this case (which subsequently became a leading authority on the matter) that 
                                                
29 A Finlay ‘CLERP: Non-Executive Directors’ Duty of Care, Monitoring and the Business Judgment 
Rule’ (1999) 27 Australian Business Law Review 98. 
30 JW Bishop Jr. ‘Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate 
Directors and Officers’ (1967-1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 1078. 
31 RM Jones (supra) at 62. See in particular the decisions of: In re Walt Disney Co Derivative 
Litigation (825 A 2nd 275 (Del Ch, 2003)); Telxon Corp v Meyerson (802 A 2nd 257 (Del 2002)); 
Krasner v Moffat (826 A 2nd 277 (Del 2003)); In re Oracle Corp Derivative Litigation (824 A 2nd 917 
(Del Ch, 2003)). 
32 See generally the argument presented in CA Riley ‘The Company Director’s Duty of Care and 
Skill: The Case for an Onerous but Subjective Standard’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 697. 
33Contemporary Company Law (supra) 555. 
34Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd [1911] Ch 425 (CA) 437 (from here on referred to as 





a director’s duty of care and skill is to act with the level of care that is reasonably to 
be expected of that particular director, which is based upon his own knowledge and 
experience. Under this test the more experience and knowledge a particular director 
has, the higher the threshold of reasonableness becomes. Of interest for this 
dissertation is to note that in Re Brazilian Rubber there is the judicial recognition that 
a director is not liable for any damages caused to the company by imprudence or 
errors of judgment.35 At closer inspection, this would seem to be a simplistic and 
fairly rudimentary recognition of the business judgment rule. 
The most defining case within the development of the duty of care in the common 
law based jurisdictions is that of Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd36 which 
authoritatively confirmed the subjective test as laid down in Re Brazilian Rubber. Re 
City Equitable was subsequently applied and confirmed in South Africa by the court 
in Fisheries Development Corporation of South Africa v Jorgensen; Fisheries 
Development Corporation of South Africa v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd37despite the 
half century time-gap between the decisions. The decision in Fisheries Development 
is widely regarded as the pariah of corporate law jurisprudence in South Africa for a 
complete lack of understanding of the realities, complexity and the role of directors 
within a modern corporation. There was no recognition in the decision of the fact that 
a modern director is a completely different corporate actor as opposed to the 
directors at the time of Re City Equitable.38 Fisheries Development laid down three 
fundamental principles which apply to the adjudication of the duty of care which are 
particularly important for the proper understanding of the statutory duty of care 
under section 76(3)(c) of the Companies Act: 
(1) A director need only exhibit in the performance of his or her duties a 
degree of skill that may reasonably be expected from a person of his or her 
knowledge and experience. Directors are not liable for mere errors in 
judgment. 
                                                
35 Contemporary Company Law (supra) 556. 
36 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 (from here on referred to as Re City 
Equitable). 
37 Fisheries Development Corporation of South Africa v Jorgensen; Fisheries Development 
Corporation of South Africa v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) (from here on referred 
to as Fisheries Development). 







(2) A director need not give continuous attention to the affairs of the 
company – the duties of a director are of an intermittent nature which are 
primarily performed within periodical board meetings; 
(3) In respect of all duties that may properly be delegated to another 
official, a director is justified (in the absence of grounds for suspicion) in 
trusting that official to perform the duties properly and honestly. This does 
not apply however to persons not authorised to perform the duties, in which 
case unquestioning reliance is not justified. 
Cassim argues that this common law formulation of the duty of care in South 
Africa is “manifestly inadequate in modern times to protect shareholders from the 
carelessness and the negligence of directors of the company”.39 This view has been 
endorsed by the Australian courts in Daniels v Anderson and it is a view with which I 
agree. I am also in agreement with Julie Cassidy where she argues that it is this more 
stringent enforcement of director duties that should be followed. 40  Outdated 
precedents and overly subjective tests leave the door too ajar for directors to avoid 
liability for breaches of the duty of care. Clearly it was necessary for the Companies 
Act to put in place a more onerous test that applied to the duty of care and skill. Of 
significant interest is that section 8.30b of the US Model Business Corporation Act41 
- a section which has had a great impact on the current section 76(3)(c) of the 
Companies Act - entails an objective determination of the duty of care. The liability 
of directors for breaches of this statutory duty of care is largely dependent upon the 
operation of the business judgment rule which underlies the importance of correctly 
understanding the duty of care and skill under the Companies Act. 
Section	  76(3)	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act	  2008	  –	  The	  Modern	  Duty	  of	  Care	  
The duty of care and skill is now rooted within the Companies Act in section 
76(3)(c). The name has been changed under section 76(3)(c) to be ‘the duty of care, 
skill and diligence’. The duty has been partially codified in line with the general 
proposition that director duties must be accessible in order for directors to easily 
                                                
39 Contemporary Company Law (supra)  558. 
40 J Cassidy ‘James Hardie: The resurrection of Re City Equitable and beyond?’ (2009) 37 Australian 
Business Law Review 312. See in this regard the case of Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission v Macdonald (No 11) (2009) 256 ALR 199 and the possible shift in Australia to a more 
lenient duty of care. 





know and be aware of the duties that apply to them. Underlying this is that the 
relevant standards of a director’s conduct can influence the profitability of a 
company, determine the extent of foreign and domestic investments and ultimately 
determine the success of a company.42 Section 76(3)(c) provides that: 
(3) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director— 
… 
(c) with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a 
person— 
(i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those carried out 
by that director; and 
(ii) having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director. 
It should be seen that the statutory duty of care is immediately less subjective and 
generally more onerous than the standard under the common law. This more onerous 
duty of care is a vital improvement upon the common law for it reflects the modern 
commercial realities which are relevant to directors. The modern director is no longer 
merely a figurehead person who may be unskilled in a particular commercial 
enterprise. Corporate directors are generally qualified persons with a vast experience 
of business.43  
The statutory duty of care is not a wholly objective determination. The particular 
context (i.e.  the position and responsibilities of the director, the nature of the 
decision that was taken as well as the size and nature of the company)44 will all be 
factors which enhance the duty from a minimum objective threshold duty towards a 
higher subjective determination. In this way the duty of care remains flexible to cater 
for the situations in which it is applied and the factual scenarios which are 
adjudicated. The default position is that the duty is to be objectively determined and 
applied in accordance with the reasonable person standard rather than the reasonable 
director standard. This is a vital improvement on the common law. It means that the 
                                                
42 J Kiggundu & M Havenga ‘The regulation of directors’ self-serving conduct: perspectives from 
Botswana and South Africa’ (2004) 37 CILSA 272 at 290. 
43 Contemporary Company Law (supra) 556-9. This is obviously a generalisation that applies 
particularly to listed public companies. 
44 This is required by section 157 of the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 and which will, 
according to Cassim in Contemporary Company Law (supra) 560, likely be similarly applied under 
section 76(3)(c) of the Companies Act. I agree with this point for variability in the application of the 







subjective factors only have the capacity to raise the standard rather than lower it 
(which was the result of the reasoning in Re City Equitable and Re Brazilian 
Rubber). 
The statutory duty of care is accordingly hybrid in nature: it has both objective 
and subjective components: section 76(3)(c)(i) is objective whilst subsection (ii) is 
subjective. This was also the position under the common law whereby the skill and 
knowledge companents have been classified as subjective whilst the care component 
has been classified as objective.45 Skill is variable, whilst care may be objectively 
determined irrespective of the director in question. The common law understandings 
and precedent regarding the duty of care and skill consequently remain relevant. 
There is a minimum objective threshold determination which is applied in 
accordance with the reasonable person standard that may be more onerously applied 
depending on the subjective knowledge, skill and experience of the individual 
director. In this way the subjective factors are no longer capable of being used to 
deaden the effect of the duty of care, they may only be relevant in creating a 
subjectively more onerous duty on the director.46 The shift in application of the 
subjective elements between the common law and the codified duty of care means 
that the more experienced, skilled and knowledgeable a director is; the more onerous 
the duty of care becomes.47 A director is not required to take all possible care – only 
the care that may reasonably be expected of that individual director is relevant to the 
determination of whether the duty has been breached or not. However: a director 
may never act in a manner less than may be expected of the reasonable person. 
3. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
RULE 
The business judgment rule is particularly widely entrenched into most facets of 
American corporate law jurisprudence. It is a principle of corporate governance that 
has been a cornerstone of American corporate law jurisprudence since the early 19th 
Century.48 It is not the purpose of this dissertation to fully trace the genesis and 
                                                
45 Daniels v Anderson (supra). 
46 Ibid at 559. 
47 Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498 (Ch); Re D’Jan of London Ltd [1994] 1 
BCLC 561 (Ch). 





history of the rule. This has been fully accomplished elsewhere.49 It is important to 
highlight, however, that the early judicial development of the business judgment rule 
expresses the rule’s core logic and limitations. These early decisions50 stress the 
importance of respecting “human fallibility” – each court stressing that directors who 
“dutifully attends to his or her duties will not be personally liable for good faith 
business decisions.”51 The business judgment rule was understood not as a complete 
defence that precluded judicial review of the process that was followed in making a 
decision. It was the actual final decision that the business judgment rule was seen to 
protect; but not the failure in process in reaching that decision. Despite the decision 
being one made in good faith, courts were not prepared to excuse directors from 
liability on the basis of their judgment being made without procedural due care.  
There has been much academic and judicial time and focus spent on attempting to 
understand the rule’s underlying policy justifications, what the rule’s correct 
theoretical formulation is, and what the proper practical application of the rule should 
be. Despite the business judgment rule’s longevity, the vast amount of relevant 
information that has been debated and discussed, and the different views on the 
subject; it seems as though there is general consensus within academics that there is 
no single unified theory that explains the rule’s practical application and where the 
boundaries of the rule should be pegged.52  
In the eyes of many commentators the business judgment rule remains an anomaly 
– a fundamental corporate law principle that is misunderstood despite its wide 
reach.53 Weinberger argues, for example, that the rule is a judicially developed sui 
generis privilege that is granted to corporations which is the judicial recognition of 
the importance of the autonomy of corporations in society.54 Even the jurisdiction of 
Delaware “lacks a coherent theory that explains why the rule exists and where its 
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limits should be placed”55 despite having arguably the most developed business 
judgment rule. 
Under Delaware law there is a “triad” of duties that a director owes to the 
company.56 These are the duties of care, good faith and loyalty. There has been some 
debate as to whether the business judgment rule should act as the mechanism from 
which the judiciary should review all fiduciary analysis en bloc. 57  Despite being 
primarily linked with the duty of care; the business judgment rule has relevance to 
not only the “triad” of duties, but to corporate law in general.58 As the business 
judgment rule has steadily developed over modern times in America (Delaware in 
particular), so this development has coincided with the diminished significance of the 
duty of care and the blurring of the fiduciary-type and negligence-type director duties 
into a single unified ‘fiduciary duty-type’ analysis.59 It seems intuitive to suppose 
that the duty of care would be violated if a director acts negligently. But judicial 
precedent, particularly in Delaware, makes allowance for the business judgment rule 
to act as a shield for directors to evade liability for a breach of the duty of care. The 
business judgment rule can accordingly operate to deflect a claim of negligence 
against a director.60 The importance of the rule lies particularly where the rule has 
operated as a shield to liability by insulating directors’ decisions against derivative 
actions against the directors for breach of the duty of care .61  
In what has become an oft-cited article both by academics and by the courts, 
Samuel Arscht described “both the substance of the rule itself and the principal 
limitations on its availability as a defence”.62 Arscht’s formulation of the rule 
endorsed both a defence allowed to directors for honest mistakes of judgment, and 
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also an outline for the relevant inquiries in determining whether the directors were 
entitled to the defence. The business judgment rule according to Arscht is:63 
“A corporate transaction that involves no self-dealing by, or other personal 
interest of, the directors who authorised the transaction will not be enjoined 
or set aside for the directors’ failure to satisfy the standards that governs a 
director’s performance of his or her duties, and directors who authorised the 
transaction will not be held personally liable for resultant damages, unless: 
The directors did not exercise due care to ascertain the relevant and 
available facts before voting to authorise the transaction, or 
The directors voted to authorise the transaction even though they did not 
reasonably believe or could not have reasonably believed the transaction 
would be for the best interest of the corporation, or 
In some other way the directors’ authorisation of the transaction was not in 
good faith.” 
The following statement is a summary of his position and the purpose envisaged 
for the business judgment rule:64 
“The rule functions not to preclude inquiry but to guide it…this inquiry is 
made, not for the purpose of ascertaining whether the decision made was 
correct or one which the court would have made, but to ascertain whether the 
evidence does or does not establish that the directors exercised due care and 
believed, on a reasonable basis, that the challenged transaction was in the 
corporations best interests.” 
This seems like such a straightforward explanation of the rule, and it draws a clear 
parallel with judicial review of administrative decisions in South Africa.65 But the 
picture unfortunately is not that clear nor simple. In Delaware for example, the courts 
have wrongly formulated and applied the business judgment rule, and in Lyman 
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Johnson’s opinion have “unsoundly made it the centrepiece of corporate fiduciary 
analysis”.66  
Much of the uncertainty stems from the Delaware Supreme Court decisions in 
Aronson v Lewis67 and the protracted Cede Litigation.68 The Delaware Supreme 
Court decision of Aronson v Lewis expressed the business judgment rule as “a 
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted 
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was 
in the best interests of the company”.69This statement remains the leading expression 
of the business judgment rule under Delaware law.70 The jigsaw is further muddled 
by the decision of Cede & Co v Technicolor which subsumed the Aronson-type 
reasoning within a broader fiduciary analysis. The court argued that the business 
judgment rule was a development on the core basic principles that directors are under 
the fiduciary duties to protect the interests of the corporation and to act in the best 
interests of the shareholders. The court argued that as a corollary of these basic 
principles, the business judgment rule “operates to preclude a court from imposing 
itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation” and adopted the 
policy decision that the rule contains “a powerful presumption in favour of actions 
taken by the directors.”71 
This analysis attempted to centre the business judgment rule within fiduciary 
analysis en bloc.72 Read together these cases have provided for not only a faulty 
formulation of the business judgment rule but also the seeping of the rule into the 
judicial analysis and review of fiduciary duties. According to Johnson there are two 
fundamental errors with this understanding of the business judgment rule. First: the 
legal principle that the business judgment rule is a presumption in favour of 
directors, although correct in principle, is not encompassed within the business 
judgment rule. Second: the extension of the business judgment rule to envelop the 
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fiduciary analysis in order to organise the fiduciary analysis into a single coherent 
framework as prescribed by the court in Cede & Co. 73  is flawed. Johnson’s 
argument; with which I agree, is that the business judgment rule should not act as a 
generalised shield to liability on which directors are entitled to rely. It should not be 
seen as a hybrid form of the duty of care or a ‘care light’. 74 The duty of care should 
remain linked with yet independent from the business judgment rule. The rule is also 
not simply at its core “a presumption that directors did not breach their duty of 
care.” 75  If the business judgment rule is neither a legal presumption, nor an 
overarching mechanism from which fiduciary duties are analysed, nor a hybrid 
formulation of a reduced duty of care - what then actually is the business judgment 
rule? How should the rule be conceived and how should it be applied in South 
Africa? 
4. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Common	  Law	  
The classic statement regarding the business judgment rule under the common law 
comes from Lord Greene MR in the case of In re Smith and Fawcett Ltd:76 
“They [the directors] must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they 
consider – not what a court may consider – is in the best interests of the 
company” 
The essence of this statement is abundantly clear: it is “not the function of the 
courts to be the arbiter of commercial decisions”.77 There was a concern under the 
common law that this statement provided for an overly subjective standard to be 
applied in instances of director negligence. The subjectivity was however tempered 
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by the requirement for the directors to act rationally and with good faith.78 In this 
way the fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill overlapped.79 
The classic statement in Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd. has been applied by numerous 
courts in a variety of contexts. There has been a generally cautious approach under 
South African common law to second-guess decisions of directors.80 The common 
thread that runs through much of the discourse is the same:81 the courts are not to act 
as a supervisory board over directors’ decisions that are honestly arrived at within the 
powers of their management,82 or alternatively that it is not for the courts to review 
the substantive merits of a decision that the directors have arrived at honestly.83 This 
is especially so considering the strained resources of the judicial system at present.84 
Although these statements are often linked with the fiduciary duty to act in good 
faith and in the best interests of the company, the same reasoning applies equally to 
the duty of care and skill. Under the common law – the courts were not in a position 
to review the merits of the decision if the final decision was a rational one and the 
directors had arrived at the decision in accordance with the fiduciary duties and using 
a proper procedure. 
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This general policy of non-review was based on the understanding that despite the 
directors being in managerial control of the company; it is the shareholders who are 
vested with ultimate control of the board of directors. It was generally accepted that 
save for in specific and rare instances, the shareholders were essentially to ‘blame’ 
for the losses suffered by the company for appointing the directors who made the 
decisions which led to the loss.85This is a questionable justification for non-review of 
directors’ decisions. The reality of the corporate democracy context is that many 
shareholders are not involved in the process of appointing of directors or will simply 
be silent on issues such as directorial appointments. Many director appointments are 
also linked with large shareholding and majority voting power and therefore the 
minority shareholders may practically have only a limited say in who is appointed as 
director if at all. It is therefore incorrect to simply classify all shareholders as being 
responsible for the appointment of directors who subsequently cause a loss to the 
company.86 
Section	  76(4)(a)	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act	  of	  2008	  
The codified business judgment rule is encapsulated within Section 76(4)(a) of the 
Companies Act. For ease of application I will quote section 76(4)(a) in full: 
(4) In respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the 
performance of the functions of director, a particular director of a company- 
   (a)   will have satisfied the obligations of subsection (3) (b) and (c) if- 
(i) the director has taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about 
the matter; 
(ii) either- 
(aa)   the director had no material personal financial interest in the subject 
matter of the decision, and had no reasonable basis to know that any related 
person had a personal financial interest in the matter; or 
(bb)   the director complied with the requirements of section 75 with 
respect to any interest contemplated in subparagraph (aa); and 
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(iii) the director made a decision, or supported the decision of a committee 
or the board, with regard to that matter, and the director had a rational basis 
for believing, and did believe, that the decision was in the best interests of 
the company; 
The first important feature to notice of this statutory business judgment rule is the 
cross reference to section 76(3)(b)-(c). This therefore demarcates the business 
judgment rule as only applying to the statutory duty of care and to the statutory duty 
to act in the best interests of the company.87 The business judgment rule in section 
76(4)(a) consequently does not apply to the common law. When the sections are read 
together it is clear that a director will “have satisfied” the statutory duty of care if the 
requirements of subsection (a)(i)-(iii) have been complied with. These are that (i) the 
decision must be an informed one, (ii) the director must have had no financial 
interest in the decision; or made a full and proper disclosure in accordance with 
section 75, and (iii) the director must have had a rational basis for believing (and the 
director must have in fact believed) that the decision was in the best interests of the 
company. 
These are the three fundamental propositions of the business judgment rule. The 
codified rule under section 76(4)(a) of the Companies Act may seem at first glance to 
be a rule which is capable of shallow interpretation and simple straightforward 
application. In my opinion this is not so. The oversimplification of the rule as 
creating “a ‘safe harbour’ from liability” or that “section 76(4) thus protects only 
informed and reasonable business decisions”, or “the merits and wisdom of business 
decisions fall outside the scope of judicial review” may lead to the incorrect 
application of the rule.88 Section 76(4)(a) is in fact imbued with a deep level of 
intricacy which must be analysed in accordance with the common law and 
experience from other jurisdictions in order to avoid the misapplication of the 
business judgment rule. The uncertainty with which the business judgment rule is 
currently vested in America must be understood and avoided in South Africa.89  
                                                
87 C Stein with G Everingham The Companies Act Unlocked: A Practical Guide (2011) 245-6. 
88 Contemporary Company Law (supra) 564-5. 
89 B Manning ‘The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention: Time for Reality’ 
(1984) 39 Business Lawyer 1477 at 1478. Manning to warns that uncertainty in the application of the 
business judgment rule “can lead only to undesirable social consequences and ultimately to a dead-end 





5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, THE 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE DUTY OF CARE 
The American experience of the business judgment rule and the current 
uncertainty which imbues the rule should be a warning shot to those dealing with the 
relationship between the business judgment rule and the duty of care, skill and 
diligence in South Africa. In Delaware in particular; the growth and development of 
the business judgment rule neatly, and unfortunately, runs parallel with the 
diminished value and importance of the duty of care.90 The current situation is a 
murky mess whereby the business judgment rule has been infiltrated into the 
fiduciary examination so that the fiduciary duties and the duty of care resembles a 
single incoherent jumble of legal precedent.  
Nowhere is this more prevalent than in an examination of the cases in America 
where the business judgment rule has been described as a less stringent duty of care – 
a ‘care light’.91 Under this conception of the business judgment rule the duty of care 
standard will be met if the lesser standards of “good faith” and “honest judgment” 
are present.92 Norlin Corp. v Rooney Pace Inc clearly misunderstands the inter-
relationship between the duty of care and the business judgment rule. This 
misunderstanding no doubt stems from the courts requiring directors to have 
“exercised a reasonable amount of diligence” as a precondition to the rule being 
applied.93 The distinction between the duty of care and the business judgment rule as 
a lesser duty of care has been carried forward to the Model Business Corporation 
Act.94 This obviously complicates the distinction between the standards of liability 
and review, thus raising the question whether the business judgment rule is a 
standard of review or a standard of liability. Under the Model Business Corporation 
Act a director may be simultaneously in breach of the standard of liability under 
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§8.30 (the equivalent to the duty of care) whilst being not liable provided the director 
has adhered to the lessened duty of care requirements of §8.31 (the statutory business 
judgment rule).  
 The Model Business Corporation Act does not codify the business judgment 
rule.95 The matter is accordingly further complicated because despite this divergence 
under the Model Business Corporation Act; a director may be exonerated from 
liability under the common law business judgment rule. This reasoning has been 
confirmed by the courts, which allows for possibly three different standards to be 
applied: (1) §8.30 of the Model Act, (2) the less onerous §8.31, and (3) the common 
law business judgment rule.96 This three tiered formulation of the business judgment 
rule and the standards of director conduct is the same as the position of the American 
Law Institute.97 Under both formulations (which are similarly structured), fulfilling 
the less stringent business judgment standard is a means of fulfilling the higher duty 
of care standard.98 All this is then further complicated by the manner in which the 
courts have practically applied the business judgment rule to act as a mechanism for 
fiduciary analysis, therefore fudging the distinction between the fiduciary duties and 
the duty of care.99  
This type of situation is untenable and South African law should avoid a similar 
scenario. As I have already discussed, the development of the business judgment rule 
in American corporate law has led to a situation whereby the duty of care and 
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fiduciary duties are lumped together into a single ‘business judgment rule-type’ 
analysis. It can safely be concluded that at present there is a wide divergence 
between the current state of the law in South Africa compared with the law in 
America;100 and South African courts should be wary of following the American 
example. It should be immediately obvious that this cannot, and certainly should not, 
be the manner in which the business judgment rule develops in South Africa. Under 
the Companies Act it seems to be clear that the business judgment rule; the fiduciary 
duties; and the statutory duty of care are to remain distinct concepts.101 
The	  Duty	  to	  Act	  in	  the	  Best	  Interests	  of	  the	  Company	  
A fiduciary duty is one where a person is in control of the assets of another. A 
fiduciary stands in a position of trust and confidence to another, i.e. a director stands 
in a fiducairy relationship with regard to a company. The fiduciary duties are largely 
derived from the English common law and entail acting honestly and for the best 
interests of the company.102 They are founded upon the concepts of honesty, loyalty 
and good faith.103 Incompetence without more should accordingly not be regarded as 
a breach of fiduciary duty. There is merely a relationship of trust between the 
company and the director, with the director undertaking to act on behalf of the 
company, and therefore subsequently the director is under the duty to act in the best 
interests of the company.104  
Section 76(3)(b) has codified this common law principle and the codfied duty to 
act in the best interests of the company is subject to the operation of the business 
judgment rule under section 76(4)(a). It is clear from the wording of the section 
76(3)(b) that directors owe their fiduciary duties to the company and only the 
company, which subsequently means that only the company may enforce directorial 
compliance with this fiduciary duty. The statutory derivative action does make 
allowance for shareholders to enforce the fiduciary duties but this is still on behalf of 
the company to protect the interests of the company (and not the shareholders or 
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another person connecting with the company).105 The primary difficulty with section 
76(3)(b) is that the term ‘the company’ is not defined in the section nor in the 
Companies Act and consequently the common law interpretation of ‘the company’ 
remains relevant.106 
Cassim raises the concern that “section 76(4) blurs the distinction between the 
fiduciary duties and the duty of directors to exercise reasonable care and skill”.107 
The codified business judgment rule under section 76(4)(a) of the Companies Act 
makes no reference to, nor requires as a precondition for the operation of the rule, 
that the decision must have been made for a ‘proper purpose’. The codified business 
judgment rule does apply to the duty to act in the best interests of the company as 
well as the duty of care, skill and diligence. By including the reference section 
76(3)(b), does the codified business judgment rule leave open to possibility for the 
American-type of uncertainty regarding the relationship between the fiduciary duties, 
the statutory duty of care, and the business judgment rule? And if so, how can this 
problem be solved?  
Avoiding	  the	  Problems	  of	  the	  American	  Experience	  
The cause of action in cases where the breach of a fiduciary duty is alleged is a 
claim for the breach of trust. Under our law the liability for breach of trust is Roman-
Dutch law based. 108 It is therefore not founded in a breach of contract nor delict, but 
has classically been regarded as sui generis in nature. 109 In contrast with the 
fiduciary-type duties, the duty of care is a concept which is derived from the English 
common law of negligence. It addresses the negligence (i.e. the reasonableness of 
conduct) of a director rather than that director’s honesty per se.110 Up until the 
codification of the duty of care, skill and diligence in the Companies Act, the duty of 
care and skill was developed within the common law and the cause of action for the 
breach of the duty lay within the law of delict. 
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An examination of what may be claimed by the company exemplifies the 
difference between a breach of the fiduciary duties and a breach of the statutory duty 
of care under the Companies Act. A breach of fiduciary duty (including section 
76(3)(b)) leads to liability under section 77(2)(a) which allows for liability to include 
“any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a consequence of any 
breach” in accordance with the common law principles regarding the breach of 
fiduciary duties.111 A breach of the statutory duty of care under section 76(3)(c) leads 
to liability under section 77(2)(b)(i) which states that the liability of a director who is 
in breach of the duty is in accordance with the common law of delict. A plaintiff 
would therefore need to prove the requirements of a delict. The distinction between 
the fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill are accordingly maintained under 
the operation of the business judgment rule.  
Although not included directly under section 77(2)(a): the common law regarding 
the damages which may be claimed for breach of fiduciary duty provides for the 
disgorgement of profits.112 A director stands in the position where there is a duty to 
protect the interests of the company, and accordingly a director may not make a 
profit at the expense of the company.113Although a claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
has typically been regarded under the common law as sui generis, I agree with Du 
Plessis where he argues that it is rather a claim properly conceived as being one of 
unjustified enrichment.114 What is vital for the current discussion is that it remains 
clear that a claim for the breach of fiduciary duties is not delictual in nature and is 
therefore distinct from the duty of care, skill and diligence.115 Delictual damages are 
clearly provided for by section 77(2)(b) – the section which explicitly refers to the 
statutory duty of care. The typical scenario is one where the company has suffered 
pure economic loss as a result of the negligent non-performance of a director’s duty 
of care. A claim in delict is one to restore the company to the position it would have 
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been in, had there been no breach of the duty of care which typically would not 
include the disgorgement of profits by the director to the company unless it was 
foreseeable that those profits would have accrued to the company at the time of the 
delict being committed.  
In what way then does the business judgment rule fudge these concepts together 
in the manner which Cassim contends? Does the business judgment rule lead to 
either the fiduciary duties allowing for a delictual claim, or the duty of care a claim 
for restitution? Are the fiduciary duties suddenly delictual in nature and the duty of 
care no longer so? Clearly there is a problem and the potential for the business 
judgment rule to be applied in a manner where the delictual statutory duty of care 
and the fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company may be confused. 
This is certainly an issue which must be addressed. It mustn’t be forgotten, however, 
that under the the common law it has been recognised that although the duty of care 
and the fiduciary duties are distinct concepts (which may lead to different claims 
being pursued); there are many instances where there “is no sharply delineated 
borderline between the fiduciary duty and the duty of care and skill. Situations may 
arise where the two overlap.”116  
This response to the concern merely sidesteps the concern rather than deals with it 
directly. To address the concern directly is important. References to good faith or 
proper purpose have been explicitly excluded under the business judgment rule in the 
Companies Act. The scope of the rule under section 76(4)(a) has been clearly defined 
to apply only to the section 76(3)(b) fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the 
company rather than all the fiduciary duties en mass. There is no cross reference or 
application of the rule to either the duty of care or the fiduciary duties under the 
common law. Although the rule does apply to the fiduciary duty of acting in the best 
interests of the company under the Companies Act, there remains a clear definition 
between the fiduciary duties and the duty of care. Accordingly – I propose that there 
should be no similar problems as to those which have riddled American 
jurisprudence on this point.  
I acknowledge that the drafting of section 76(4)(a) is not clear, and further I 
propose that the legislature should remove the reference to section 76(3)(b) from the 
                                                





ambit of the business judgment rule. The reason for this will be made abundantly 
obvious below. This does not mean that the argument presented by Cassim is a 
critical flaw in the South African business judgment rule as codified in section 
76(4)(a). The problem is a valid one, but it should not lead to the removal of the 
statutory business judgment rule from the Companies Act. At most it may require an 
ammendment to the Companies Act in order to remove the cross reference in section 
76(4)(a) to section 76(3)(b), and the phrase “the decision was in the best interests of 
the company” in section 76(4)(a)(iii). 
A	  Brief	  Comparison	  with	  Australia	  
Australia has, like South Africa, adopted a codified business judgment rule 
despite academic criticism warning against doing so.117 Unlike the Australian law 
regarding the codified business judgment rule which requires the decision to have 
been made for a proper purpose, our business judgment rule does not. 118  In 
comparison with the rule under section 76(4)(a) the Companies Act, section 180(2) 
of the Corporations Act makes provision for the business judgment rule to operate as 
a defence to both the common law and statutory duties of care.119 This may 
obviously present a problem of the business judgment rule encroaching too far into 
the common law duty of care analysis and may open the door to being applied within 
the broader fiduciary analysis as is the situation in America.  
These are problems which are not particularly relevant to the law in South Africa 
as has been discussed above. The codified business judgment rule has no operation to 
the common law in any form. The Australian experience of a codified business 
judgment rule does have inherent value, for South Africa can learn the lessons from 
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another English common law derived jurisdiction which has codified a business 
judgment rule into company law. Most importantly it does raise the point which I 
stress throughout this dissertation: in order for the business judgment rule to find a 
proper place within South African corporate law it must be applied in a limited 
manner which avoids the uncertainty and overreaching nature of the common law 
business judgment rule in America.  
The	  Position	  in	  a	  Nutshell	  
The business judgment rule is not a substitute for the fiduciary duties or the duty 
of care and skill. It is limited in its scope of application as merely an adjunct 
principle to the duties under sections 76(3)(b)-(c); and then it is further limited only 
to the single directorial function of decision-making rather than director functions en 
bloc. This will be made clearer below. If the decision-making process is found to 
have been appropriate with reference to the requirements of section 76(4)(a), a court 
will not subsequently review the merits of the decision for doing so may involve the 
court possibly substituting its own “business judgment” for that of the directors.120 
The obvious concern is that doing so would impinge on the core responsibility and 
role of directors which the legislature saw fit to specifically reserve for them.121  
The confusion which vests in the American business judgment rule (especially the 
interrelationship between the fiduciary duties and the rule) can simply be avoided by 
noting that when the duty of care is at issue; and thus the business judgment rule; it is 
the process the decision was come to rather than the merits of the decision which is 
under investigation.  It is this process oriented review which is within the ambit of 
the courts’ competency. It is not the role of the courts to assess what a board of 
directors should or should not do or what policies should or should not be pursued; 
nor whether a particular business decision was substantively correct or not. The 
courts can review the process as to how the decision was reached and then whether 
the decision was a rational one. As was the case under the common law, the courts 
would severely overstep the line of the recognised juristic personality and 
independence of corporations and undermine the office, role and functions of 
directors if they were to adjudicate the substantive merits or wisdom of a business 
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decision. A review of the substantive merits of a particular decision is something 
which should only be done, if at all, in the mnost extreme cases. The individual legal 
personality and resultant ‘free will’ of a corporation’s directors must be respected by 
the courts. 
6. JUSTIFYING THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AS A STANDARD OF 
REVIEW RATHER THAN A STANDARD OF LIABILITY 
On the face of it, the business judgment rule seems straightforward. However; the 
business judgment rule is imbued with a deep level of intricacy despite the apparent 
simplicity of the it’s operation. The rule may be theoretically conceived and 
subsequently practically applied in three different ways. First: the rule can be 
understood as a standard of liability which courts can adopt as the yard-stick by 
which to review the decisions of directors. Second: the rule may be understood as a 
doctrine of judicial abstention or deference. Or third: it may be viewed as a doctrine 
of immunity which insulates the directors from liability resulting from bad decisions 
provided certain requirements are met. Under each of these formulations there will 
be different procedural and practical rules which develop from the theoretical base. 
The theoretical base determines the method, manner and form of judicial application 
of the business judgment rule which will ultimately have the capacity for “outcome-
determinative effects”.122 It is important therefore to fully investigate what the 
correct conception of the rule should be. 
Ultimately the decision as to which theoretical conception is best is not a simple 
decision. The decision will need to be determined by reference to the particular 
policies and philosophy (of which there will be varying competing interests) which 
underpin corporate law. The crux of the matter is to determine the appropriate 
balance between judicial respect for directors’ business decisions against the judicial 
review of those decisions which are seen to be flawed with the power of hindsight.123 
The focus of this chapter will be to propose the justification as to why the business 
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judgment rule should “shield directors from liability for good faith business 
decisions, even those that turn out to be mistaken”.124 
The	  Difference	  Between	  Standards	  of	  Review	  and	  of	  Liability	  
A standard of liability specifies the manner in which directors should conduct the 
affairs of the company. It prescribes the how to act; when to seek advice or defer a 
decision to another; the relevant process to be followed and so forth. A standard of 
review is the test (or tests) that courts employ in order to determine whether a 
particular director’s conduct gives rise to liability – i.e. whether the standard of 
liability has been breached in some manner.125 According to Professor Eisenberg, it 
is a fundamental feature of corporate law that “standards of conduct pervasively 
diverge from standards of review”.126  
This distinction between a standard of review and a standard of liability is 
incorporated within The Model Business Corporation Act. §8.30 requires that 
directors act in good faith and in a manner which the director reasonably believes to 
be in the best interests of the company. This is a standard of liability. Director 
conduct which adheres to this standard cannot lead to liability. A director will not be 
liable if that director’s conduct adheres to the provisions of §8.31.  This section is a 
standard of review – therefore liability may only result only if the director acted in 
bad faith, did not reasonably believe to be in the corporations best interest, was not 
informed to the extent the director reasonably believed to be appropriate given the 
situation, was interested in the transaction, was not independent, engaged in self-
dealing, or failed to exercise oversight over a sustained period. 
The reason for this divergence is rooted within the juridical nature of reviewing 
directorial decisions – the judiciary is institutionally not in the correct position to 
judge with the power of hindsight a decision which, at the time of making the 
decision, was ex ante correct or reasonable; but which ex post facto was not. There 
are many other policy factors which may be relevant in this argument, but which are 
not the primary focus of this dissertation. Some factors may include a lack of 
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expertise and skill among the members of the judiciary and hindsight bias.127 The 
crux of the argument is that each business decision is imbued with uncertainty in a 
manner which differentiates directorial decision making from those of other 
professionals subject to a typical agent-principal setting (i.e. doctors or lawyers). 
Persons in this typical agent-principal setting may be held to objective standards of 
conduct which are capable of ex post facto judgment. The reasonableness of a 
doctor’s decision for example, may be assessed ex post facto.128  
Contrast this situation to one where the success of directors is differentiated by the 
innate ability to determine which business risks are worth taking or not. Every 
business decision is unique in terms of the factors and context which imbues the 
decision. Much of the time business decisions are infused with uncertainty. A 
director’s success is determined by the ability to identify which opportunities will or 
will not be successful.  This is fundamentally different to the doctor-type of situation 
where an objective ex post facto assessment may determine negligence. It is exactly 
because business decisions are inherently subjective in their nature which makes the 
review of business decisions so tricky. It is for this exact reason that business 
decisions should not be judged according to a standard of liability.129  
Applied	  to	  the	  Business	  Judgment	  Rule	  
The business judgment rule is the mechanism adopted to facilitate judicial respect 
for directorial decisions. It would not be fair to impose liability on every director 
whose decisions fall foul of bad luck. The concept of uncertainty is at the core of the 
business judgment rule. One of the main functions of a director as opposed to other 
professions is that directors must of necessity take commercial risks. Even in 
instances where the most careful investigations have been concluded it can never be 
said that a particular business decision is perfectly secured from uncertainty. It is 
important to state that we are dealing here with uncertainty and not risk (i.e. the 
potential of harm occurring is not necessarily foreseeable). Risk may be assessed by 
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way of foreseeability, whereas uncertainty lacks this sense of foreseeability. 
Uncertainty may thus be regarded as unforeseeable risk. It is trite law in delict that a 
person should not be held liable for harm which was ex ante unforeseeable.130 The 
same should apply in the context of the duty of care – a director should not be held 
liable for the harm that occurs but which was not foreseeable at the time of making 
the decision. The power of hindsight should not be used as a mechanism with which 
to impose liability on directors for making a particular decision if that decision turns 
out to be an incorrect one. 
Unlike other professions, directors in many instances assess situations and make 
context based decisions upon uncertainty; not risk.131 What this implies is that 
outcomes can hardly be predicted with a sufficient degree of particularity at the time 
the decision is made. Predictions and probabilities will often be difficult to ascertain 
with any degree of specificity.132 However – these are the features of business 
decisions. Uncertainty is an inherent factor in most (if not all) business decisions. 
Consequently nearly every business decision when viewed ex post facto may 
potentially be viewed as negligent. Honest, cautious, attentive, qualified and 
intelligent directors may in certain instances be found negligent despite his or her 
best efforts in making a business decision if the decision is viewed against a standard 
of liability.133 This is obviously unfair and incommensurate with the role of the 
corporate law and the duty of care that applies to directors. 
Provided that the proper procedural steps have been followed throughout the 
decision making process, and provided that the pre-decision steps were reasonable 
and the decision a rational one; a decision that leads to an unlucky or negative result 
should be protected by the business judgment rule. It is the uncertainty that imbues 
the decision at the time the decision is made that is the root cause of the loss and not 
the directors’ conduct in making the decision. The business judgment rule can be 
justified as it does not permit the ex post facto judicial assesment of a decision that is 
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ex ante reasonable. What is of concern within the context of judging director 
decisions is not whether the decision in question was objectively the correct decision 
or not. The duty of care does not apply to the actual making of the decision. Rather it 
applies to the decision making process. It is the procedure relevant to the decision 
making process to which the business judgment rule and the duty of care and skill 
relate, and not to the actual result of the decision making process.134  
When ex post facto adjudicating upon a business decision, it will at times be 
impossible to attempt to decipher between whether a particular business decision was 
a bad decision, or whether it was a proper decision which unluckily turned out badly. 
A director at the time the decision is made is faced with making a judgment which is 
vested with uncertainty. Provided the director makes a decision in accordance with 
the correct process and the duty of care, and provided that decision was a rational 
one; then the director has not made a decision from which liability should attach to 
him. Inevitably there will always be some decisions which fall on the fortunate side 
of luck, and some which do not. Should a director be held liable for being unlucky in 
a particular decision that was taken properly, but which turned out to be wrong in 
hindsight? The answer must clearly be no. And this is the importance of the purpose 
of the business judgment rule.  
In corporate law there is a clear divergence between the standards of liability and 
review which apply to directors. In Eisenberg’s opinion – the duty of care is a 
standard of liability whereas the business judgment rule operates to be a standard of 
review.135 In typical negligence lex acquilia cases the reasonable person standard is 
applied to both the standard of conduct and review. In corporate law and the 
directors’ duty of care the position is different. There is a clear divergence between 
the standard of review and standard of liability. The business judgment rule creates a 
less demanding standard of review than the standard of liability such that despite a 
particular breach of the standard of conduct no liability attaches despite the breach. 
Eisenberg argues that the business judgment rule consists simply of four 
preconditions which if satisfied allow for directors’ decisions to be reviewed under a 
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limited standard compared to the standard of liability or conduct which is relevant.136 
Accordingly – the business judgment rule, if applicable, lowers the standard of 
review from the duty of care standard to a lower business judgment-type standard. 
What this lower business judgment-type standard of review is remains contested in 
American jurisprudence. Attempting to define what this lower standard of review 
should be raises difficult theoretical problems which have been prevalent in causing 
the uncertainty in America.  
South African the courts are extremely hesitant to sanction actions made mala 
fides. Section 77(9) of the Companies Act makes it clear that any decision which is 
to be protected by the business judgment rule must be absent mala fides. Whether the 
standard is objective or subjective, or alternatively the level to which a decision must 
be objective, is a trickier problem to address. At a minimum it would seem that 
intuitively the standard could not be purely subjective. If this standard were adopted 
as a standard of review serious problems would arise. As an example: an irrational 
decision would be protected so long as the decision was made in subjective good 
faith. In my opinion – it would appear that there is no simple solution to this 
problem. At a minimum it would appear that the decision must be rational.137 But 
this does not bring about a proper solution. It is but a minimum threshold 
determination. 
Professor Eisenberg makes the argument that the business judgment standard is 
one based wholly within rationality. In his opinion a rationality based standard 
preserves a “minimum and necessary degree of director and officer 
accountability”.138 This argument is based upon the conception that a rationality 
based standard of review is more demanding of a director than a subjective-good 
faith standard; but remains sufficiently subordinate to the level of conduct that is 
required by a standard based upon reasonableness. In an attempt to justify this lower 
business judgment-standard of review as being one of rationality rather than 
reasonableness; Eisenberg argues that any standard of review which imposes liability 
on a director “for unreasonable as opposed to irrational decisions might therefore 
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have the perverse incentive effect of discouraging bold but desirable decisions”.139 In 
his opinion the role of the business judgment rule is therefore to offset the tendency 
that directors may have in not pursuing risky yet potentially lucrative decisions. This 
tendency is rooted within the divergence between corporate gain and director loss: if 
a decision turns out to be lucrative then it is the company benefits directly; not the 
directors. Directors may legitimately benefit indirectly through bonus payments and 
possible increases in remuneration. This is a separate matter. In the case of corporate 
loss it is the directors who may be required to make up to loss.140 
7. BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AS A DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL 
DEFERENCE OR  A DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY 
In my opinion this is not the correct solution for I am of the view that not only 
must a decision be rational, but it must have a sufficient degree of reasonableness, 
i.e. the decision must also be reasonable to some degree. The answer is not as simple 
as stating that it is sufficient for the business judgment rule to apply that a particular 
decision must simply be rational. There is another plausible solution. In the 
following chapters I propose what I believe is the correct theoretical conception and 
practical formulation of the business judgment rule in section 76(4)(a) of the 
Companies Act. It is imperative that uncertainty be removed from the application of 
the rule in South Africa and my solution removes much of the uncertainty which 
Eisenberg raises.  
The business judgment rule needs to be applied and developed on a case-by-case 
basis going forward, especially considering the lack of authoritative precedent 
concerning the rule in South Africa. It would be a mistake to simply adopt and apply 
the authorities and case precedent from the American jurisdictions. The approach of 
South African courts needs to take into account the unique corporate laws, corporate 
governance provisions, the role and position of corporate actors and the particular 
socio-economic realities of South Africa. It is vital to determine exactly how the 
business judgment rule should be applied considering the rule’s recent introduction 
to, and its position within, South African corporate law. 
                                                








Given the wording and formulation of the business judgment rule in the 
Companies Act, it is more appropriate that the elements listed in subsections section 
76(4)(a)(i)-(iii) be conceived as threshold requirements which allow for directorial 
immunity from personal liability (or for judicial deference to the directors’ decision) 
rather than lowering the standard of review within the decision-making context of the 
duties of sections 76(3)(b)-(c). Accordingly – a business decision may be incorrect or 
result in harm to the company, but directors will “have satisfied the obligations of” 
sections 76(3)(b)-(c) and therefore personal liability cannot attach to them. This 
conception of the business judgment rule allows for judicial deference or directorial 
immunity from personal liability if the listed requirements are met, therefore it 
accords with the American common law and removes much uncertainty in the 
application of the rule. This chapter will examine and discuss whether the rule is best 
conceived as a doctrine of immunity or as a doctrine of judicial deference; or 
alternatively whether it is possible to model a South African specific business 
judgment rule that cherry-picks elements from each conception.  
Business	  Judgment	  Rule	  as	  a	  Doctrine	  of	  Judicial	  Deference	  
Professor Bainbridge advocates the business judgment rule to be a doctrine of 
judicial abstention, or an abstention doctrine. The ‘core proposition’ upon which his 
analysis is founded is that the business judgment rule in effect seeks to balance the 
inherent tension between authority and accountability on a case by case basis. 141 It is 
true that a proper balance needs to be struck between allowing for the exercise of 
directorial discretion whilst concurrently requiring directors to be held accountable 
for their decisions; but is the business judgment rule the appropriate mechanism by 
which to accomplish this balance? And further – how can the business judgment rule 
facilitate an effecting balance between these competing interests? 
One of the primary arguments within American jurisprudence at the current time 
is that the balance to be struck should be skewed towards allowing for greater 
director authority over accountability. Bainbridge argues that directors’ decision-
making procedures and processes function best when directors’ decisions are 
insulated from being undermined by the courts through judicial review mechanisms. 
For Bainbridge, the most efficient model of director decision making is one where 
                                                





there is no risk of judicial review; in essence a practical application of a director 
primacy model of corporate governance.142 The director primacy model stands in 
contradistinction to the widely accepted shareholder primacy model of corporate 
governance in America and advocates that a board of directors do not act as an 
“agent of the shareholders” but rather as “the embodiment of the corporate 
principal”.143 
The business judgment rule is the mechanism by which the inherent tension 
between accountability and authority is resolved. Under this director primacy model 
of corporate governance, accountability through judicial intervention should yield to 
directorial authority. The business judgment rule consequently functions as a policy 
of judicial abstention of the review of directorial authority. Using the terms which 
are no doubt well-known to South African lawyers, the business judgment rule is 
therefore a rule which mandates judicial deference to directors’ decisions; review of 
the decisions is permitted only when specific preconditions are met. 
There is an inherent appeal to the judiciary not having the intrinsic jurisdiction to 
second-guess or review the decisions of directors, and in turn to either supplement or 
substitute a particular decision with their own. This has already been discussed above 
and need not be repeated in full here. Bainbridge argues that when the traditional 
leading case of Schlensky v Wrigley144 is closely re-examined, it becomes clear that 
the core discourse of the business judgment rule is merely a “strong presumption 
against judicial review of duty-of-care claims.”145 This formulation of the business 
judgment rule is clearly different to that of the common law in Delaware and 
especially the conception of the rule in Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc. which 
presents the business judgment rule as a substantive doctrine which allows for the 
courts to substantively review the merits of a particular directorial decision. Lyman 
Johnson is also of the opinion that the common law business judgment rule is 
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misconceived and is rather nothing more than a policy of judicial non-intervention or 
deference.146  
The argument within the decisions of the courts during the prolonged Cede 
Litigation and the subsequent cases clearly treats the business judgment rule as a 
substantive standard of judicial review.147 It seems to be so embedded into the 
American corporate law jurisprudence, and particularly that of Delaware, that the 
minority of cases argue that the objective reasonableness of directorial decisions is 
not capable of review by the courts.148 It is best to use a direct quote from the 
Corporate Directors Guidebook: Third Edition149to illustrate how engrained this has 
become in American jurisprudence: 
“The business judgment rule is not a description of a duty or standard used to 
determine whether a breach of duty has occurred; rather it is a standard of 
judicial review.” 
The Delaware Supreme Court in the Cede & Co. v Technicolor, Inc decision 
described the business judgment rule as a rule which is aimed at precluding “a court 
from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation.” 150 It 
is the use of the term “unreasonably” in the description which has created the serious 
confusion. The problem becomes immediately apparent when compared to the 
description of the business judgment rule in the previous leading case authority (and 
the authority which much of the argument and the final decision of the Delaware 
Supreme Court was based).  
The business judgment rule as stated in Smith v Van Gorkom151 makes it clear that 
the purpose of the rule is to “protect and promote the full and free exercise of the 
managerial power granted to Delaware directors”.152 At the risk of being overly 
semantic in the analysis of the description and although perhaps not intended by the 
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court in Cede & Co. v Technicolor; the formulation of the business judgment rule 
using the term “unreasonably” very clearly allows for substantive judicial review. 
The result has in due course shown to be the confusion as to whether the business 
judgement rule should be properly understood as a substantive standard of liability or 
a standard of review; or rather an evidence-based “presumption” against judicial 
interference; a procedural rule; or as a policy of judicial deference to directorial 
decisions.  
The wealth of both judicial and academic literature on the subject speaks for itself. 
There is a mass of uncertainty in the American jurisprudence that should be avoided 
in the application of the business judgment rule in South Africa. The South African 
courts need to avoid the clear confusion present within the dictum of the Delaware 
Supreme Court in McMullin v Beran:153 
“The business judgment rule “operates as both a procedural guide for 
litigants and a substantive rule of law”. 
Section 76(4)(a) uses the phrase “will have satisfied the obligations of subsection 
3(b) and (c) if …”. This phrase implies that the South African business judgment rule 
is certainly not a substantive standard of directors’ liability. It does not connote an 
enquiry as to whether the duty of care, skill and diligence has been breached by a 
director or a board of directors. It also does not require an investigation into the 
substantive correctness of the decision that was taken. It seems clear from the 
wording of section 76(4)(a) that the business judgment rule as encapsulated in the 
Companies Act is to allow for the section 76(3)(b)-(c) enquiry to be avoided by a 
defendant director. It would be incorrect to see the business judgment rule under 
section 76(4)(a) to require the shareholder challenging the directors’ decision in 
litigation “(t)o rebut the rule” by assuming “the burden of providing evidence that 
directors, in reaching the challenged decision, breached any one of their triads of 
fiduciary duty”.154   
Another inappropriate formulation of the business judgment rule for South Africa 
is any formulation of the rule that holds “for the rule of judicial deference to be 
invoked, directors of a board must be found to have met not only their duty of loyalty 
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(i.e. fiduciary duties) but also their duty of care”.155 Such a formulation of the 
business judgment rule in South Africa would require directors to prove a lack of the 
breach of the duties under section 76(3)(b)-(c) to avoid liability. This approach to the 
application of the business judgment rule would simply not fit with the requirements 
of the Companies Act. The rationale of the business judgment rule as formulated 
under section 76(4)(a) of the Companies Act is surely to prevent a court from 
enquiring into whether the statutory duty of care and the duty to act in the best 
interests of the company had been breached. At a minimum, the rationale is to 
mandate judicial respect of corporate independence and the role and functions of 
directors within corporations. It goes without saying that the relevant threshold 
criteria and information would need to be presented before the business judgment 
rule under section 76(4)(a) would apply.  
Professor Bainbridge’s conception of the business judgment rule as an abstention 
doctrine is founded upon a director primacy model of corporate governance. He 
argues that the director primacy model should be supported by both shareholders and 
directors; for shareholders will tolerate risk-taking whilst directors will not be 
hesitant to take risks if the threat of liability is not present. The argument is that 
shareholders should be willing to accept less accountability, and also greater risk of 
loss, for the result of potentially gaining greater corporate profits.156  
As I will argue below – this director primacy-based conception of the business 
judgment rule does not sit well with the South African approach to corporate 
governance. In conjunction with this, I am not persuaded that this reasoning holds 
true in the current context. I am not convinced that shareholders are willing to place a 
gamble on greater corporate gain and accept risking similar losses which recent 
experience has shown to be so devastating. I am suspicious of an argument proposing 
that shareholders should be willing to invest in a corporate law framework that would 
allow for shareholders to accept the risk of another Enron or WorldCom type of 
scandal. Corporate greed and directorial accountability has been a topic with which 
there is a vast amount of interest from both genuine prospective shareholders and the 
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public in general since these and other corporate scandals.157 It would be incorrect to 
advocate for a corporate governance system or business judgment rule that further 
shields directors from being accountable to their shareholders; especially in South 
Africa where there is the scope for both immense corporate growth and 
concomitantly great corporate greed and subsequent scandals.158  
The greatest concern with the abstention doctrine conception of the business 
judgment rule is that the substantive matter of director liability is by default largely 
removed from judicial review. It is true that if the business judgment rule does apply 
(i.e. the requirements of section 76(4)(a) are met) the practical effect of the rule will 
be the courts abstaining from substantively evaluating the merits or correctness of the 
directorial decision. If the business judgment rule is to be applied in the manner 
advocated by Bainbridge (i.e. whereby the default position of the judiciary is 
deference rather than review of the decisions of directors), judicial abstention will 
become the norm and review would be the exception to the rule.159 The issue of 
directorial liability will be dealt with only in very exceptional circumstances. Once 
again the oft cited statement of Joseph Bishop would likely ring true – the search for 
cases where a corporate director would be held liable for a breach of section 
76(3)(b)-(c) would be “a search for a very small number of needles in a very large 
haystack”.160 
Business	  Judgment	  Rule	  as	  a	  Doctrine	  of	  Immunity	  
McMillan presents an interesting argument as to the correct theoretical foundation 
and practical application of the business judgment rule in America. Her argument is 
based upon the parallels between immunities (whether public or private) and the 
business judgment rule. For the purposes of her argument she defines a legal 
immunity as having the effect of shielding “the recipient of the immunity from civil 
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liability for actions undertaken by individuals acting in a specific capacity”.161 The 
effect of the business judgment rule is to shield directors from civil liability for 
decisions made whilst acting in the office of a director. Immediately there would 
seem to be an intuitive similarity between the concept of a legal immunity and the 
business judgment rule. 162  This similarity provides the basis upon which her 
argument is developed and which may provide the theoretical model which is useful 
in correctly understanding and practically applying the business judgment rule under 
section 76(4)(a) of the Companies Act. 
According to McMillan’s argument, the philosophical grounds underpinning 
immunities in general closely resemble the justifications which are associated with 
the business judgment rule.163 The most notable of these is that immunities reassure 
persons making decisions that involve the exercise of discretion to make the best 
decision possible rather than forcing them to make the obviously safe 
decision.164Further – immunities grant the recipient of the immunity protection 
against hindsight bias, which whether explicit or not, may be a factor in any ex post 
facto adjudication of the merits of a business decision. Directors may be ‘forced’ to 
defend their decisions against aggrieved shareholders who rely on the power of 
hindsight in ex post facto alleging directors’ conduct as being negligent which may 
potentially detract from the proper exercise of directors’ role and purpose. Directors 
cannot guarantee perfection in the fulfilment of their obligations.165 Fallibility is 
simply a facet of human nature and any director is capable of mistakes. Mistakes will 
always be made. To require absolute substantive perfection in every business 
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decision is simply an unreasonable expectation!166 It is the errors which a reasonable 
person would not have made that should be subject to judicial review. 
There are two primary justifications for the business judgment rule to function as 
a doctrine of immunity. First is the argument that if directors are making “safe” 
decisions which are based largely on the fear of personal liability, there is potential 
for the company to suffer; and hence for the wider economy to also suffer. Second is 
that viewing the business judgment rule as a doctrine of immunity may inhibit the 
judiciary from assessing whether the duty of care, skill and diligence has been 
breached; for provided that the threshold requirements of section 76(4)(a) have been 
adhered to then the directors are “immune” from liability and the decision may be 
insulated from judicial review. No further enquiry may be made as to whether the 
duties under section 76(3)(b)-(c) have been breached.  
Practically there will be little difference between conceiving the rule as either an 
immunity doctrine or as a doctrine of judicial deference. Under the immunity 
doctrine the directors are entitled to use their full discretion in making a certain 
business decision. They will be immune from liability attaching to them for that 
decision provided that at the time of making the decision the decision was one that a 
reasonable person would have made. Provided the requirements of section 76(4)(a) 
have been met, then the court is not permitted to review whether the section 76(3)(b)-
(c) duties have been breached. The business judgment rule would not function as an 
absolute immunity but rather as a qualified immunity in that the protection afforded 
by the rule is dependent upon the defendant directors proving their entitlement to the 
protection. 167 
The philosophical underpinnings of immunities in general are largely 
commensurate with the policies and justifications which have been presented for the 
business judgment rule.168 The practical effect of the operation of the business 
judgment rule under section 76(4)(a) would certainly be to “insulate directors from 
liability for their business-related decisions”.169 Provided the requirements of section 
76(4)(a) are met, the directors are immune from liability for that decision. The value 
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of this approach is that the defendant directors are necessarily required to prove their 
entitlement to the immunity. There is no examination into the merits of the decision, 
nor whether the directors have breached the duties in sections 76(3)(b)-(c). There is 
not even an examination into good faith. Under this conception the list of 
requirements in sections 76(4)(a)(i)-(iii) operate to demarcate what the directors must 
prove in order for the business judgment rule to apply. This approach certainly does 
have an intuitive appeal. But does this mean that it is this approach which should be 
favoured over the deference-based approach already discussed? 
8. THE MOST APPROPRIATE FORMULATION FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
The	  Practical	  Differences	   the	  Different	  Models	   of	   the	  Business	   Judgment	  
Rule	  
The court in Kamin v American Express Co.170 provides a prime example of the 
practical operation of the deference construction of the business judgment rule. In 
Kamin the decision of the board of American Express was clearly incorrect and yet 
the court dismissed the litigation for the failure to state a claim.171 The court 
developed upon the reasoning of Schlensky v Wrigley172 to present the strongest 
formulation of the deference based formulation of the business judgment rule: 
“The directors’ room rather than the courtroom is the appropriate forum for 
thrashing out purely business questions which will have an impact on profits, 
market prices, competitive situations or tax advantages.”173 
The underlying discourse is that the courtroom is not the appropriate forum, nor 
litigation the correct mechanism, for shareholders to enforce directorial 
accountability. Directors should not be held “liable for simply making mistakes, even 
if those mistakes result in substantial costs to the corporation and its shareholders”.174 
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The business judgment rule will only operate if certain threshold requirements are 
met, which will be adherance to the requirements as listed in section 76(4).175  
The business judgment rule should not practically permit the courts to merely 
authorise, confirm or rubberstamp the decision of the board of directors irrespective 
of its merits. Nor should the rule be confused as a standard of liability. As both the 
courts in Schlensky 176  and Kamin 177  make it clear: the deference based 
conceptualisation of the business judgment rule does not preclude a court from 
reviewing whether a particular decision was imbued with either fraud or self-
interestedness. This does not mean that the court should be permitted to review the 
substantive correctness, wisdom or otherwise of the decision. In this way the 
deference-based conception of the business judgment rule functions to preclude 
courts from deciding whether the duty of care was breached during the decision 
making procedure whilst concurrently protecting the company from directors who 
abuse their position and fraudulently or intentionally cause a harm to the company.  
The role of the courts in applying the business judgment rule will be to correctly 
balance the interests of respecting directorial authority and deferring to the decisions 
of directors provided those decisions were properly taken whilst maintaining director 
accountability to both stakeholders and shareholders. Balancing this tension is the 
central problem with the practical application of the business judgment rule as 
conceptualised as a doctrine of judicial deference. There is no easy solution as to 
how this balance should be struck. The decision as to what the default position 
should be will be based upon a policy decision that accords with the corporate laws 
and corporate governance provisions of South Africa in general. 
In the case where the business judgment rule is conceptualised as an immunity 
doctrine the position is somewhat different. The business judgment rule can only be 
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seen as a qualified immunity rather than an absolute immunity. 178 To argue that the 
office of a director imbues that director with absolute immunity from liability would 
be contrary to all law concerning director liability, most notably the duty of care, 
skill and negligence. To do so would also open the gates for directors to act without 
adherence to any such duties for the fear of liability would be irrelevant.  
There is intuitive appeal in requiring a defendant director to prove that the 
protection afforded by the business judgment rule should apply in any given 
instance.179 This requirement allows for each case to be approached on its merits and 
allows for variation in the application of the rule to each and every case. The 
practical effect (i.e. if the rule is found to apply and therefore that the immunity 
becomes enforceable) remains that the director is insulated from liability, but the 
theoretical rationale is different to the deference based conception of the rule. Rather 
than the judiciary defering to the decision of the director, the director is entitled to 
the protection of the rule only if the court finds that this should be so. 
The court decides, based upon the evidence and argument presented by the 
director, whether the director is entitled to qualify for the protection of the business 
judgment rule. The burden of proof falls squarely on the shoulders of the director 
who must accordingly prove entitlement to the protection of the rule. This would 
mean proving adherence to the requirements of section 76(4)(a)(i)-(iii) of the 
Companies Act. The focus of the immunity doctrine is therefore a “procedural 
checklist” of factors with which the director must comply.  
This approach is intuitively appealing for it requires the director to positively 
prove his or her entitlement to the immunity rather than having the default position 
being merely shielding the director from review which is what the deference-based 
approach advocates. The immunity doctrine would seem to closer align with South 
Africa’s corporate governance ideals regarding the conduct of directors. More 
particularly – the immunity doctrine would lead directors to be in a position to 
account for their decisions rather than allow for directors to be in a default position 
where their decisions are shielded from judicial review and the onus is placed on the 
shareholders to justify review.  
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Taking this approach a step further; it is correct to regard the requirements of 
section 76(4) as “the elements of the objective standard required for the application 
of a qualified immunity.”180 Qualified immunities require the actor who may be 
accorded the immunity to prove the reasonability of his actions, after which an 
evaluation of that conduct is made by the court and the immunity is either granted or 
not. It is not the substantive correctness of the conduct that is judged. In many 
instances liability may not attach even if the conduct is seen as having being 
incorrect ex post facto. For liability to attach the conduct must be ex ante 
unreasonable. Conduct which is ex ante justified will not be wrongful and therefore 
liability will not result. 181  This is a similar approach to the evaluation of 
wrongfulness in delict.182 
South	  African	  Approach	  to	  Corporate	  Governance	  
Corporate governance may be defined as being the appropriate principles and 
practices which directors and managers should adhere to in the fulfilment of their 
roles and duties.183 It is “ultimately about effective leadership” and control of 
companies and is concerns those who control companies; i.e. the management and 
directors of companies. 184 Integrity is recognised as the foundation of the South 
African corporate governance provisions which in practice equates to “ethical values 
of responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency”. 185 Investment and the 
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subsequent growth of the economy are indisputably linked with an effective and 
proper corporate governance framework and is therefore vital in South Africa.186 
The corporate governance framework in South Africa has undergone various 
changes since the introduction of the first publication of the King Report on 
Corporate Governance in 1994.187The Third King Report and Code on Corporate 
Governance (“King III”) read together with the provisions relating to corporate 
governance within the Companies Act form the backbone of the current corporate 
governance regime in South Africa. Read together these regulate directors and 
directorial conduct so that there is compliance with minimum statutory requirements 
(as required by the Companies Act) as well as seeking to adhere to international best 
practice (as encapsulated in King III).188 
The first notable difference between the provisions in America189 and those of 
South Africa is that the King III provisions rely on a philosophy of ‘apply or 
explain’. The purpose is for directors to consider the manner in which the principles 
and recommendations of King III may be practically applied. It is aimed at creating 
an awareness and understanding within company management and directors “why” 
the principles should apply, rather than requiring blind compliance and it is hoped 
that this will have the practical result of wider and more thorough compliance.190 
Most business judgment litigation in America has been concerned with the 
shareholder-director relationship. Claims have been brought by aggrieved and 
disgruntled shareholders as a result of directorial decisions which have caused losses 
or harm to companies. It is the board of directors and management, and not the 
shareholders, whom are mandated with the day-to-day management of the business 
and affairs of the company.191  The ultimate authority over directors (i.e. the 
appointment and removal of directors, and whom the directors are accountable to) 
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remains vested with the shareholders.192 The second important difference between 
the corporate governance in America and that in South Africa is that the relationship 
between the shareholders and directors is balanced in the favour of the shareholders 
rather than the directors.193  
This does not mean that shareholders are in the position to determine how the 
company is administered, nor are they capable of usurping the roles and duties of 
directors. Shareholder litigation which is aimed at a review of the substantive merits 
of a directorial decision should not be easily entertained within the courts. The courts 
are not the appropriate forum for this process for there are internal mechanisms 
which allow for such review and shareholder enforcement of directorial 
accountability. One mechanism is the potential for removal of a director by the 
shareholders which, on the whole, is a more appropriate mechanism for enforcing the 
accountability of directors to the shareholders. Section 165 of the Companies Act is 
an example of an external accountability enforcement mechanism. This codified 
derivative action is aimed at being more streamlined,194 broader in reach and 
available to a wider range of applicants. 195 These accountability-focused provisions 
provide more ammunition to shareholders in holding directors to account for their 
actions as opposed to the shareholders in America.   
The general thrust of the corporate governance provisions regarding decision-
making in America remains primarilly concerned with shareholder profit 
maximisation.196 The King III Report requires that companies should conduct their 
business with economic, social and environmental responsibility.197 This mandates 
directors to account and be responsible for the company’s “triple bottom line” rather 
than merely the financial bottom-line.198 The King III Report also mandates a 
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‘stakeholder-inclusive’ approach for when directors asses in whose interests the 
company should be managed.199 A company may have a multitude of stakeholders 
that have the potential to affect the long-term success of the company.200It is 
consequently no longer proper for directors to only consider the interests of 
shareholders which allows increased scope for directors to exercise their discretion in 
determining what is in the best interests of the company.  
South Africa also has unique factors which relate to the South African business 
context in particular, and to Africa in general. One such example is that directorial 
decisions will often be influenced by reference to black economic empowerment 
partnerships.201  Racial as well as economic and financial considerations form part of 
social and corporate responsibility in South Africa. These are issues upon which 
directors of South African companies will base their decisions.202 Coupled with the 
‘stakeholder-inclusive’ approach to corporate governance mandated by the King III 
Report, the pure profitability of a company may suffer as directors are driven 
towards implementing corporate responsibility policies. This in turn may lead to 
shareholder discontent, and then litigation which claims for the breach of section 
76(3)(b)-(c) of the Companies Act.203 
Closely linked with the business judgment rule and a fundamental principle of 
corporate governance in general is the management of risk. Risk is a concept that 
lacks a precise legal definition and subsequently has different meanings depending 
on the context within which it is used but is defined under King III as being “the 
taking of risk for reward”.204 Principles 4.1 and 4.2 of the King III Report mandate 
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the board of directors to be responsible for managing the level of risk that the 
company can be exposed to. There is a wealth of detailed provisions which concern 
the assessment, management and documentation of risk in the provisions of King 
III.205 Adherence with these principles may potentially provide evidence for directors 
as to their compliance with listed under the business judgment rule in section 
76(4)(a). This would then allow for protection from liability which may have resulted 
under section 76(3)(b)-(c). This is particularly so considering the requirement under 
section 76(4)(a)(iii) “that the decision was in the best interests of the company”. 
Now more than ever it is appropriate for shareholders of South African companies 
to respect the exercise of directorial discretion in making decisions. All these 
differentiating factors must be assessed along with the general judicial policy of the 
courts which in America; especially the courts in Delaware and in particular the 
Delaware Supreme Court; have been generally sympathetic to directors and have 
erred on the side of deferring to their judgment.206These are but some of the 
differences between the corporate governance provisions, philosophy and policies of 
America and those of South Africa.  
It should go without saying that it is necessary to develop and apply the business 
judgment rule so that it accords with the nuanced features of South African company 
law in general and in particular the corporate governance regime. South African 
corporate law has a different core focus and policies compared to those of American 
corporate law. The director primacy model of corporate governance that Bainbridge 
argues as so important and which provides the basis of his analysis of the business 
judgment rule in America is a perfectly understandable approach for the American 
corporate culture and the policies inherent to American corporate law jurisprudence 
in general. This justification of the business judgment rule as being tantamount to a 
doctrine of judicial deference simply does not fit correctly with the general trends 
and policies inherent to corporate law in South Africa. South Africa should not adopt 
verbatim the precedent regarding the application of the business judgment rule as it 
has been applied in the American jurisdictions. The inconsistencies between 
corporate law in South Africa and that of America, in particular the law and policy 
regarding corporate governance,  will no doubt create inconsistencies and confusion 
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in the South African law regarding the application of the business judgment rule if 
we do not clarify and apply a consistent interpretation of the rule. 
Formulating	  a	  South	  Africa	  Specific	  Model	  
Each approach has intuitive appeal but for different reasons. It is important to 
determine which elements of each approach are appealing and will gel within the 
South African law. It must be remembered that the section 76(4)(a) business 
judgment rule is a new addition to South African corporate law and so a firm assured 
footing is vital for the lucid growth and development of this area of the law. The 
formulation of a South Africa specific business judgment rule is necessary and its 
application will require sensitivity and “judicious restraint”. 207  To present the 
decision as a decision between either the deference or immunity doctrines would be 
to create a false dichotomy. It is appropriate in this instance to “cherry-pick” from 
each doctrine and formulate the business judgment rule in a manner that best adheres 
to South African corporate law provided that the various elements once pulled 
together can be individually justified and the business judgment rule is practically 
effective.208 
The immunity doctrine conceptualisation of the business judgment rule closer 
aligned with the rule as one being a ‘standard of liability’which is inappropriate for 
South Africa. 209  Yet the procedural aspects of this conceptualisation have a definite 
appeal in that it aids to greater directorial accountability and may potentially aid in 
making directors aware of their duties and obligations under sections 77(3)(b)-(c) 
and 76(4)(a). Requiring the directors to have the onus of proving entitlement to the 
protection afforded by the rule is perfectly justifiable. Directors should be under the 
burden of proving entitlement to the protection of the business judgment rule, rather 
than the plaintiff shareholders proving that the directors are disentitled to the 
protection of the rule. This is a policy-based decision which in my opinion creates 
the best balance between accountability and authority that is demanded by South 
Africa’s corporate governance policies, the approach to directorial accountability, 
equity and fairness. 
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 There should be no chilling effect on decision making nor on justified and 
reasonable risk taking. What is required of directors under this functional approach is 
the preparedness to justify a decision in accordance with the requirements of section 
76(4). They will not be asked to justify their conduct under the duties under section 
76(3)(b)-(c) which means that they are not required to present evidence as to the ex-
ante reasonableness or substantive correctness of their decision. This has the appeal 
of making the law in this complicated area more accessible to directors which aligns 
with the stated aims of the Companies Act. The procedure would hypothetically be a 
straightforward one. Directors would have a clear understanding of what is expected 
from them as directors when making a decision, and also an understanding as to what 
the procedure is for when those decisions turn out badly.  
This approach serves to create a viable balance in terms of the inherent tension 
between the accountability and authority of directors. Directors should not enjoy 
unfettered carte blanche in the performance of their duties; yet should not be overly 
hindered in the performance of those duties by the shackles of accountability. Placing 
the onus on directors in requiring them to account for the threshold requirements of 
section 76(4) is not a hindrance. All the director is required to do during the 
fulfilment of his or her duties is to document adherence with the requirements of the 
business judgment rule. This does not invade the authority of directors.  
I propose that both directors and shareholders will support this functional 
approach. Directorial authority will only be impinged by the judiciary if the 
substantive correctness of the decisions are regularly reviewed. This will not happen 
under the operation of the business judgment rule and is therefore a means to protect 
the director from an assesment as to whether the has been breached. This approach 
does not provide an easier method for aggrieved shareholders to hold directors liable 
for losses to the company. Nor is the door opened wider for liability to attach to 
directors for decisions which subsequently turn out to cause harm to the company.  
The procedural aspects of the immunity doctrine should therefore be applied to 
the business judgment rule under section 76(4)(a). Section 76(4)(a) however aligns 
with the deference approach mandated by Bainbridge for if the preconditions 







from the review of the merits of that decision.210 Perhaps it is more appropriate in 
both semantics and policy, to use the term “respect” rather than the typical terms 
“abstain” or “defer”. The question to be addressed under section 76(4)(a) is 
accordingly whether the directors’ conduct satisfied the standard for judicial 
respect?211 In comparison to the rule as applied in America, there is not the same 
concern as to determine exactly what conduct is relevant or required for the rule to 
come into operation. There is not the same flexibility and variability dependent upon 
the facts of each case at bar for the threshold requirements are listed in section 76(4) 
that section, and only if those requirements are met will the rule protect the directors 
from personal liability and their decision from review. 
It is worth noting at this stage that Scarlett presents an argument as to the 
ineffectiveness of the abstention doctrine type of formulation of the business 
judgment rule. In her argument the business judgment rule is:  
“too limited to be useful…because it would not prohibit court review in cases 
alleging fraud or breaches of the duties of loyalty or good faith, it is designed 
to apply only to a small category of business judgment rule cases – those 
alleging a breach of the fiduciary duty of care”.212 
Simply put – this is not a problem for the application of section 76(4)(a). In fact it 
supports the argument that has already been presented above: section 77(9) protects 
the company against director fraud and intentional wrongdoing, whilst it is clear that 
the business judgment rule should not apply to the fiduciary analysis.  
9. THE PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Lyman Johnson describes the relationship between the duty of care and the 
business judgment rule as one of “the least understood relationships in corporate 
law”.213 It is the purpose of this chapter to summarise what I propose the correct 
practical application of the business judgment rule should be and to clarify what I 
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perceive to be the correct relationship between the business judgment rule and the 
duty of care in South Africa.  
The business judgment rule should be applied as a doctrine of judicial deference, 
but the courts should only defer to the decision of the defendant directors if those 
directors are able to prove the requirements of section 76(4)(a)(i)-(iii). It may 
accordingly be described as a qualified judicial policy of non-review rather than as 
an immunity or as a doctrine of judicial deference. The rule is intended to preclude 
judicial review of business decisions which by their very nature require the exercise 
of directorial discretion.214 If the requirements of section 76(4)(a) are met by the 
directors then the business judgment rule will apply, which subsequently immunizes 
the substantive quality or correctness of the business decision from judicial review. 
In this way the business judgment rule will operate as a pre-enquiry to any duty of 
care proceedings. 
It must be remembered that the business judgment rule and the duties of care, skill 
and diligence and to act in the best interests of the company are distinct legal 
concepts which have different purposes, but which remain fundamentally linked 
under the Companies Act. The statutory duty of care is a standard of liability which 
demarcates how directors must discharge their duties whilst the business judgment 
rule should be regarded as a qualified policy of judicial deference. It concerns the 
manner in which directors conduct themselves in the fulfilment of their role as 
director and applies to all the conduct of directors generally. Within the decision-
making context it requires a specified degree of care to be used in making business 
decisions. The business judgment rule on the other hand, should be regarded as a 
narrow concept in comparison. It must be interpreted to apply specifically (given the 
commonly applied ‘name’ of the rule) to only if and when a ‘business judgment’ has 
been made by directors.215  
Immediately there is a problem with this argument in that section 76(4) of the 
Companies Act would seem to permit a far wider application of the rule to the duty 
of care, skill and diligence generally. The plain language drafting of the Companies 
Act, which although aimed at aiding in the accessibility of the law, has once again 
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led to uncertainty for it is legally imprecise and unclear.216 The exact scope of 
application of the rule to director functions is therefore vague and must be addressed. 
There are two points of vital interest: 
First: the business judgment rule cannot be relied upon by defendant directors to 
protect “wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust”.217Under section 77(9) it is 
required for the director to be relieved from liability, either wholly or partly, to have 
acted “honestly and reasonably”.218 This section has an impact on the operation of 
the business judgment rule, for when read with section 76(4)(a) it adds the vital 
qualifier that no fraudulent conduct will be protected by the rule nor sanctioned by 
the courts. 
Second: section 76(4) states that “(i)n respect of any particular matter arising in 
the exercise of the powers or the performance of the functions of director”;219 
provided that the elements in section 76(a)(i)-(iii) have been met, the director “will 
have satisfied the obligations of subsection 3(b) and (c)”. It is concerning to see that 
the introduction to section 76(4) generally would allow for an interpretation whereby 
the business judgment rule applies to the duty of care, skill and diligence en bloc 
rather than just within the decision making context. Compared with this introduction 
to section 76(4); the requirements of section 76(4)(a)(i)-(iii) nevertheless very clearly 
apply to the process of decision making. There is explicit reference to “the subject 
matter of the decision”, that “reasonably diligent steps to become informed above the 
matter” are required, and that “the director made a decision...and the director had a 
rational basis for believing, and did believe, that the decision was in the best interests 
of the company”.220 
There is clearly a discord between the introduction to and the specific 
requirements of the business judgment rule in section 76(4). How should this section 
be interpreted? I propose that a narrow interpretation be adopted to the application of 
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the business judgment in section 76(4). A narrow interpretation to the business 
judgment rule is to be preferred for the following reasons: 
 First; a wide interpretation would be overbroad. It would have the capacity of 
engulfing the statutory duty of care as a whole which surely cannot have been 
intended by the legislature. This must be the case given the correct position under the 
common law of the business judgment rule upon which section 76(4) is based. 
Second; there is no guidance in the discussion papers regarding the Companies Act 
or the amendments to the Companies Act as to the intended scope of application of 
the rule. It is only stated that ‘a business judgment type of defence’ was included to 
allay fears of the shift from the subjective duty of care to the more objective nature 
of the duty of care under the section 76(3)(c).221 This allows for the narrow 
interpretation to be adopted as there is no guidance which suggests or requires a  
different interpretation. 
Third; the purpose of the business judgment rule will be best served by the narrow 
interpretation of the rule. It is important to revisit what the purpose of the business 
judgment rule is and accordingly why the rule was born and developed in the 
American common law. There are many differing justifications for the business 
judgment rule and it is not important to list and discuss all the justifications here. It 
should suffice to state that the purpose of the rule is to allow judicial respect for the 
autonomy of corporations in society and the proper exercise of directorial discretion. 
It is not to protect defendant directors from the bounds of the duty of care in general. 
Directors should obviously be subject to the operation of the duty of care, skill and 
diligence in the fulfilment of their role as directors. Linked with this, and the fourth 
reason which lends support to my interpretation, is that this duty would be largely 
nullified if the business judgment rule is given a wide interpretation to include all 
directorial conduct. Finally; from the discussion above it should be clear that the 
business judgment rule is not a standard of liability and should not be allowed to 
muddy the waters of the duty of care. The distinction between the statutory duty of 
care and the business judgment rule should be clearly defined. This will be best 
accomplished by a narrow interpretation of section 76(4).  
                                                








Section 76(4) should be amended to clarify the position and to limit the 
application of the business judgment rule to instances where directorial discretion has 
been excercised and a business decision has been made. Until such time as a 
legislative amendment is made, this may be accomplished by adopting a narrow 
interpretation of section 76(4). The defendant director should be under the burden of 
proving that section 76(4) applies. This is simply a policy-based decision which has 
been addressed above.  Provided the business judgment rule is found to apply, i.e. the 
defendant director is capable of proving the requirements of section 76(4), then the 
substantive reasonableness or correctness or wisdom of the decision will be removed 
from the scope of judicial review. This may be justified on the basis of avoiding 
judicial hindsight bias where judges run the risk of assuming “bad results as 
conclusive evidence of bad behaviour”.222 
I have argued, given the increased burden of the statutory duty of care, that it is in 
the interests of shareholders, directors and the judiciary to have a statutorilly 
mandated business judgment rule and that the rule is a necessary addition to South 
African company law. South Africa should be wary of allowing the judiciary to 
impinge upon free enterprise – the business judgment rule will act as the mechanism 
which ensures this doesn’t occur.223 The rule is also an important factor in drawing 
highly qualified individuals to become directors. The dictum of Judge Winter in Joy 
v North224 best summarises the importance of the rule: 
“Although the rule has suffered under academic criticism, it is not without 
rational basis. ... [B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential 
risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create 
incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions. ...Shareholders can reduce 
the volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings. In the case of the 
diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well be the 
best choice since great losses in some stocks will over time be offset by even 
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greater gains in others. ...A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly 
riskier alternatives thus may not be in the interest of shareholders 
generally.”225 
At the core of the business judgment rule is whether courts should judge the 
reasonableness of directors’ decisions. Judicial respect of directorial discretion and 
decisions is not the same as simply the abandonment of the judicial post. The 
judiciary retains the possibility of intervention in appropriate cases such as when 
there is fraud or self-interestedness which imbues a decision. But in what instances 
should directorial accountability trump directorial authority? What is the appropriate 
level of judicial respect to directors’ decisions that should be adopted within the 
corporate law sphere in South Africa? Therein lies the crux of the problem. 
Provided that the requirements under section 76(4) have been proved by the 
director in question, judges should be highly deferential to the decisions of directors 
under the business judgment rule. Section 76(4)(a) only protects rational decisions 
which are based upon reasonable premises. Judicial deference will accordingly be the 
default position, whilst review can occur in particular instances when appropriate. It 
is important for directors to freely exercise their discretion and for risky yet 
potentially lucrative decisions to be taken provided that there is adherence with the 
requirements of the corporate governance provisions under King III. Each case must 
be adjudged on its own merits.226 I propose that the more discretion that is required 
in a decision, the more respect the judiciary should show to the decision. Judicial 
deference is not an all or nothing exercise and should capable of variable application. 
For after all – with the upmost respect, it still remains the case that many judges are 
“radically incompetent” to judge decisions which are inherently complex and made 
within a general sphere of uncertainty where perfect results are never possible.227  
The most fundamental point I have addressed is that there must be a clear 
delineation between the business judgment rule and the duty of care. They must be 
conceived and applied as independent concepts despite the cross reference between 
the duty of care and the business judgment rule in the Companies Act. There must be 
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a clear differentiation between the analysis required under the duty of care, skill and 
diligence and the business judgment rule despite the two concepts being 
fundamentally linked. The courts must be cautious not to blur the two concepts 
together for this would recreate the ‘American-esque’ position of uncertainty 
regarding the rule in South Africa. This is best accomplished by a narrow 
interpretation of the business judgment rule and by adopting the practical approach 
which I have proposed. 
I am strongly opposed to viewing the business judgment rule as formulated in 
section 76(4) of the Companies Act as a standard of liability for this may open the 
door to the adverse effects of hindsight bias and the problems which have ravaged 
the American experience of the business judgment rule. Conceiving of the rule as a 
standard of liability would allow for judicial evaluation of the statutory duty of care 
to take place before the rule is actually applied. This is obviously incorrect for it runs 
contrary to the purpose and function of the rule. 
The rule should be understood as merely a policy of judicial deference that is 
applied in a South African specific manner that accords with our corporate law and 
legal policies. It is a hybrid device which has elements of both a qualified immunity 
and a doctrine of judicial deference. The business judgment rule under section 76(4) 
of the Companies Act will practically function as mandating judicial deference whilst 
requiring the defendant director to prove entitlement to the protection of the rule. Its 
function should be limited to merely removing the substantive correctness of 
business decisions from judicial review.  
Prior to the introduction of the Companies Act, Jones concluded that: 
“In South Africa, the law on the duty of care and skill owed by a director to 
his company is relatively clear, and adopting the business judgment rule is 
likely to confuse the issue for the courts and ultimately make it easier for 
errant or negligent directors to escape liability. Most commentators agree 
that there is no need for South African law to adopt the business judgment 
rule.” 228 
                                                
228 E Jones (supra)  at 336 citing the works of M Havenga ‘The Business Judgment Rule - Should we 






It is easy to understand why there has been academic concern with the 
codification of director duties and the introduction of the business judgemnt rule 
under the Companies Act.229 Probably the main reason behind the distrust with the 
adoption of a business judgment rule under the Companies Act was the uncertainty 
which abounds within the American jurisprudence on the topic and misunderstanding 
the operation of the rule.230 As enacted under the Companies Act, if the business 
judgment rule is seen as a statutorily mandated policy of judicial deference, the 
uncertainty is greatly avoided.  When there is a defined list of requirements which a 
director must satisfy before the courts will defer to the directors’ judgment, this 
uncertainty is accordingly further nullified. The business judgment rule should 
accordingly not be viewed with distrust. There is the potential for the rule to greatly 
enhance director accountability to shareholders if applied in the manner which I have 
proposed.  
South Africa needs to avoid a situation where the business judgment rule may 
lead to a “culture of apparent indifference or deliberate disregard on the part of those 
responsible for the well-being of compan(ies)”231 in that the rule must not operate as 
an “insurmountable barrier”232 to liability. It should be self-evident that corporations 
are vital actors with society, and consequently that directors are in position to have a 
profound influence upon the economic growth of South Africa. Poor corporate 
guidance and the associated corporate failures and scandals have an adverse effect on 
investors, employees and creditors. Public confidence in financial markets may be 
negatively impacted which will have implications upon the economy as a whole. In 
short – there may be said to be a direct correlation between specific business 
judgments and the wider interests of the general public in South Africa. The adverse 
effects of decisions which are imbued by the breach of the staturoty duty of care may 
accordingly have far wider effects than merely the dissatisfaction of shareholders. It 
is important to demarcate clearly what the correct position regarding the business 
judgment rule should be with regard to South Africa, for the application of the 
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business judgment rule may prospectively have a profound and wide-ranging impact 
upon directorial decision making. 
The business judgment rule has constantly developed and has been undergoing 
significant development in recent years within the American common law. The 
decision to codify the rule in the Companies Act may therefore seem an odd one, 
especially given the recent developments regarding the position of good faith in 
corporate law jurisprudence and the law in general.233 Despite this concern there is 
no need to be wary of the operation of the business judgment rule in South Africa. 
The inclusion of the business judgment rule in the Companies Act potentially 
provides for better adherence to the statutory duty of care as well as facilitating 
directorial accountability.  
In order to promote directorial accountability for decisions the business judgment 
rule needs to be applied in the manner suggested above. It is desirable for directors to 
be able to take corporate risks provided that the corporate governance provisions 
which govern corporatethe management of risk are adhered to. Directors must 
however remain accountable to shareholders in particular, and stakeholders 
generally, for their decisions. The business judgment rule under section 76(4)(a) is 
the judicial mechanism which can provide the means to balance this tension between 
accountability and authority. This may subsequently enhance effective corporate 
leadership and decision making which will have a direct impact upon the proper 
functioning and growth of the South African economy. 
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